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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal involves a contract for the purchase of goods. Under this contract, TRC

Fabrication, LLC (“TRC”) located in Idaho Falls, Idaho, agreed to purchase steel tubing from
Brown Strauss Steel Co. (“Brown Strauss”) located in California. Under the terms of the contract,
Brown Strauss retained ownership of the steel tubing until tendered at TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls
and therefore agreed to transport the steel tubing at its own expense and risk. Because Brown
Strauss was contractually obligated to transport at its own expense, the entire purchase price to be
paid by TRC was allocated to the purchase of the steel tubing. No portion of the purchase price
was allocated to transportation or delivery.
Brown Strauss hired Jay Transport to transport the steel tubing. Jay Transport engaged
Dale Kelly (“Dale”) to transport the shipment. Upon arriving at TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls, Dale
on behalf of Brown Strauss tendered the steel tubing to TRC, at which time TRC took ownership
of the steel tubing and began unloading it from the trailer. TRC used a large forklift to unload the
steel tubing. TRC’s forklift operator negligently dropped the steel tubing, which slid across the
pavement and violently struck Dale, injuring his right leg, ankle, and foot.
Dale and his wife, Nancy Kelly (“Nancy”), filed a complaint against TRC for damages
resulting from TRC’s negligence. The district court dismissed Dale’s complaint after concluding
that the steel tubing contract was a contract for services governed by the Idaho Worker’s
Compensation Act (“Act”) and that TRC was entitled to statutory employer immunity under the
Act.
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Dale and Nancy filed this appeal to correct the district court’s erroneous determination and
dismissal of the complaint. The contract for the steel tubing in this case was a contract for the
purchase of goods governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and not a contract for
services governed by the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act Because it was not a contract for
services, the Act and its statutory employer immunity are inapplicable. The district court’s decision
and the dismissal of Dale and Nancy’s complaint should therefore be reversed.
B.

Course of Proceedings
In their Complaint, Dale and Nancy alleged that Dale, a professional truck driver from

Pocatello, was severely injured after transporting a large shipment of steel tubing from Brown
Strauss’s facility in Fontana, California to TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Dale’s injury
occurred when TRC’s employee operating its telehandler lost control of the top tier of the shipment
after lifting it off of Dale’s trailer and backing away. After falling from the forks of the telehandler,
multiple pieces of steel tubing slid along the pavement towards the trailer and violently struck
Dale’s right leg, ankle, and foot, inflicting severe personal injuries, including comminuted
fractures to his tibia and fibula. The injuries necessitated three surgeries. Dale’s medical expenses
alone exceeded $145,000. R. pp. 9-12.
Dale’s negligence claim against TRC included his allegation that TRC’s telehandler
operator exceeded the lifting capacity of its telehandler by 1.5 times and otherwise failed to
exercise reasonable care to maintain control of the load. Nancy’s claim for loss of consortium was
also asserted in the Complaint. R. pp. 12-14.
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In its Answer, TRC admitted that it purchased more than 43,000 pounds of steel tubing
from Brown Strauss, which arranged for Jay Transport to haul the shipment from Fontana,
California to TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls. It further admitted that Jay Transport assigned the
transportation of this shipment to Dale. R. p. 18. TRC denied all allegations of negligence and
asserted several affirmative defenses, none of which are pertinent to this appeal. Id.
Following depositions of Dale and Nancy, John Hender, TRC’s telehandler operator, and
two other TRC employees or former employees, TRC filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that it was Dale’s statutory employer and therefore immune from Dale’s negligence
claim. R. pp. 30-43. The Kellys opposed the motion, asserting that TRC was not Dale’s statutory
employer since TRC had not entered into a contract for trucking services but had only entered into
a contract for purchase of goods. R. pp. 84-104.
The district court heard arguments on TRC’s motion for summary judgment on
November 13, 2019. R. p. 199. In a Memorandum Decision and Order issued December 3, 2019,
the district court granted TRC’s motion for summary judgment. R. pp. 198-211. In doing so, the
district court focused on what it deemed to be a contractual term between TRC and Brown Strauss
-- “F.O.B. DELIVERED.” Misconstruing the established legal meaning of this term, the district
court concluded that TRC was contracting with Brown Strauss both for the purchase of the metal
tubing (a contract for the sale of goods) and for delivery of the tubing (a contract for services).
While the district court acknowledged that TRC did not request input regarding the means of
delivery, the district court concluded that TRC “ultimately paid the costs of delivery.” R. p. 206.
Since the contract between TRC and Brown Strauss, as construed by the court, involved the
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provision of some services, the district court concluded that TRC was a category one statutory
employer of Dale. R. p. 207.
The district court further concluded that TRC had failed to present sufficient evidence in a
timely manner to support its alternative claim that it was also a category two statutory employer
of Dale, and therefore, denied TRC’s motion for summary judgment on that alternative basis. R.
p. 209.
Finally, after referencing the Kellys’ concession, the district court concluded that Nancy’s
claim for loss of consortium is wholly derivative of her spouse’s negligence claim. Since the
district court concluded that Dale’s claim was barred by statutory employer immunity, it ruled that
Nancy’s claim for loss of consortium must be dismissed as well. R. pp. 209-10.
The district court entered Judgment for Dismissal in favor of TRC on December 12, 2019.
R. pp. 212-13. The Kellys’ Notice of Appeal was filed December 17, 2019. R. pp. 214-18.
TRC filed its memorandum of costs and attorney’s fees the same day as the Kellys filed
their appeal. Supp. R. pp. Aug. 1-25. In addition to its costs as a matter of right, TRC sought
recovery of certain discretionary costs and all of its attorney’s fees under I.C. § 12-121. Id. The
Kellys filed a motion to disallow all of the claimed discretionary costs and all of the claimed
attorneys’ fees. Supp. R. pp. Aug. 26-56.
The district court heard arguments on Kellys’ motion to disallow on January 30, 2020. In
a Memorandum Decision and Order entered February 18, 2020, the court awarded costs as a matter
of right to TRC in the amount of $1,343.42. Supp. R. p. Aug. 73.
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With regard to TRC’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees, the district court noted that
under I.C. § 12-121 the trial court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in
instances where the judge finds that the case was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation. The district court also noted that parties who make good faith arguments for
the extension or modification of existing law do not act in a frivolous manner for purposes of I.C.
§ 12-121. Supp. R. pp. Aug. 72-73.
The district court ruled that the Kellys sought to extend or modify Idaho law and had not
pursued the action frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. In reaching these conclusions,
the district court observed that the Kellys’ opposition to summary judgment was based on I.C.
§ 72-102(13)(a) defining “employer” as “any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or
contracted the services of another.” (Emphasis added by court below). The district court noted that
the Kellys argued that TRC’s contract with Brown Strauss was for the purchase of goods and not
a contract for services. Alternatively, the Kellys argued that to the extent TRC’s contract with
Brown Strauss involved a contract for services, the district court should apply a predominant factor
test, as used by the federal magistrate judge in Schuler v Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, and find
that the contract was predominantly for the sale of goods. Finally, the district court noted that the
Kellys also cited multiple non-Idaho cases, distinguishing between service contracts and contracts
for the sale of goods as applied to statutory employer immunity. Id. 1

1

The district court’s decision also noted that the Kellys had obtained support from two liability
experts, a truck safety expert and a forensic engineer, before initiating suit. Furthermore, the court
also noted that the statutory employer immunity defense had not been raised until TRC filed its
motion for summary judgment, which was nine months after TRC had filed its answer.
5

The district court also denied TRC’s request for all claimed discretionary costs, ruling that
the items claimed were not exceptional costs, which in the interest of justice should be assessed
against the Kellys. Supp. R. pp. Aug. 74-76.
C.

Statement of Facts
On January 12, 2018, TRC issued Purchase Order No. 25227 to Brown Strauss covering

items ultimately set out in nine invoices for materials shipped from Brown Strauss between
January 18, 2018 and January 23, 2018. The Purchase Order was in the total amount of
$156,407.15. R. p. 113.
On January 19, 2018, Brown Strauss issued Invoice No. 803034 to TRC covering the steel
tubing transported by Dale Kelly. This invoice was one of the nine referenced on TRC’s purchase
order. The invoice itemized 27 pieces of steel tubing of various dimensions and with a total weight
of 43,236.2 pounds. The purchase price was $25,857.84. The invoice further indicates that the
order was shipped from Brown Strauss to TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls on January 19, 2018. The
invoice does not identify the carrier transporting the shipment, but it includes a reference to
“F.O.B. DELIVERED.” R. pp. 118-19. Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, this
F.O.B. notation required that Brown Strauss retain ownership of the steel tubing until delivered
and that Brown Strauss at its “own expense and risk” transport the steel tubing to TRC’s facility
in Idaho Falls. See I.C. §§ 28-2-319(1)(b), 28-28-2-401(2)(b). Because Brown Strauss was
responsible for transportation at its “own expense and risk” while it remained the owner of the
steel tubing, no portion of the purchase price in Invoice No. 803034 was allocated to transportation.
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Instead, the entire purchase price was allocated to the purchase of the steel tubing. R. pp. 113, 11819.
Brown Strauss hired Jay Transport to transport the subject shipment from Fontana,
California to Idaho Falls. Jay Transport billed Brown Strauss $1,850 for transporting this shipment.
R. pp. 18, 129.
Jay Transport offered the subject shipment to Dale Kelly. He accepted. Mr. Kelly picked
up the load at Brown Strauss’ facility on January 19, 2018 and delivered it to TRC’s facility in
Idaho Falls on January 22, 2018. R. pp. 18, 105-07, 120-29 (Roche Aff. ¶ 4, Exh. 3).
Dale had no responsibility for unloading his trailer upon arrival at TRC’s facility. He had
no control over the unloading process. He did not intervene in the unloading process. Rather, he
was positioned at the end of the trailer when TRC’s telehandler operator removed the top layer of
the load. He remained at the end of the trailer until seeing that the operator backed away from the
trailer about sixteen feet. As the operator continued to back away from the trailer, Dale walked up
the passenger side of his trailer so as to push the wood boards, used as dunnage to separate the top
layer from the bottom layer of the shipment, off to the driver’s side of the trailer where his storage
bins were located. His actions at TRC’s facility were no different than what he had safely done
before on many occasions when delivering similar loads. R. pp. 131-38 (D. Kelly Dep., pp. 63, 6667, 83-88, 93-94).
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erroneously concluded that the steel tubing contract in this
case was a contract for services instead of a contract for the purchase of goods.
2. Whether the district court erroneously concluded that the steel tubing contract in this
case was subject to the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act.
3. Whether the district court erroneously concluded that TRC was entitled to statutory
employer immunity under the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act.
4. Whether the district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of TRC.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the
same standard used by the trial court in originally ruling on the motion.” Gomez v. Crookham Co.,
166 Idaho 249, 253, 457 P.3d 901, 905 (2020) (quoting Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho
207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003)). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Id. (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 163 Idaho 910, 916, 422 P.3d 1116, 1122 (2018)).
Any disputed facts and all reasonable inferences from the evidence are to be construed in favor of
the non-moving party. Idaho First Bank v. Bridges, 164 Idaho 178, 182, 426 P.3d 1278, 1282
(2018). This Court exercises free review over all questions of law, including statutory construction.
State v. Amstad, 164 Idaho 403, 405, 431 P.3d 238, 240 (2018).
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act and its statutory employer immunity
Statutory employer is a concept based on Idaho’s Workers Compensation Act (Act). By

way of background, this Court has noted that the Act “has a dual policy to provide not only for
employees a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for
employers a liability which is limited and determinative.” Gomez, 166 Idaho at 255, 457 P.3d at
907 (citing Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho 763, 766, 450 P.2d 610, 613 (1969)).
The Act imposes a statutory system for compensating injured employees. I.C. § 72-201.
Employers are required to pay for workers compensation insurance for their employees. I.C. §§ 72203 & 72-210. Employees who are injured on the job receive compensation for on-the-job injuries
through the workers compensation system, generally to the exclusion of other compensation from
their employers. I.C. §§ 72-209 & 72-211. The exclusive nature of this worker’s compensation
remedy is referred to as the exclusive remedy rule. Robison, 139 Idaho at 209, 76 P.3d at 953.
Although not applicable to this case, I.C. § 72-209(3) sets out an exception to the exclusive
remedy rule in instances where the injury is caused by the willful or unprovoked physical
aggression of the employer. Gomez,166 Idaho at 256, 457 P.3d 908. In instances where the
exception applies, the employee is permitted to recover worker’s compensation benefits under the
Act and also pursue an injury action against the employer in a court of law. Id. (citing Dominguez
ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 12, 121 P.3d 938, 943 (2005)).
The concept of statutory employer is based on the Act’s expansive definition of the term
“employer.’’ I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) provides as follows:

9

"Employer” means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or
contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It
includes the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the
proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there
being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer
of the workers there employed. … (emphasis added).
This Court has noted this statutory definition of employer is an expanded definition of the
term as traditionally understood at common law. This expanded definition was designed to prevent
an employer from avoiding liability under the workmen’s compensation statutes by subcontracting
its work to others who may be irresponsible and not insure their employees. “Thus, a statutory
employer is anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting out services is liable to pay worker’s
compensation benefits if the direct employer does not.” Robison, 139 Idaho at 210-11, 76 P.3d at
954-55 (citing Harpole v State, 131 Idaho 437, 440, 958 P.2d 594, 597 (1998)). See also, I.C. § 72216.
The Robison Court further explained that the case law surrounding the definition of the
term “employer” is what the Court refers to as the statutory employer analysis. Moreover,
“[b]ecause the legislature used the identical language from the statutory definition [of “employer”]
when crafting third-party tort immunity under I.C. § 72-223, this Court determines the statutory
employer analysis is a necessary tool in determining the meaning and scope of I.C. § 72-223.”
139 Idaho at 955, 76 P.3d at 211.
The exclusive remedy rule has never prevented injured employees from collecting workers
compensation benefits and also pursuing liability claims against certain third-party tortfeasors.
Until 1996, I.C. § 72-223(1) allowed employees to pursue third-party liability claims against a
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statutory employer if the statutory employer’s contractor or subcontractor had the required
worker’s compensation insurance to cover the employee’s injury and worker’s compensation
benefits. Id.
However, as explained by the Robison Court, the 1996 amendments to I.C. § 72-223
exempts from third-party liability all statutory employers. As amended, Idaho Code § 72-223(1)
provides as follows:
The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that the
injury, occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances creating in
some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor, such
person so liable being referred to as the third party. Such third party shall not
include those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under
them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions
of section 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include the owner or lessee of premises, or other
person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on,
but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason,
is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed.
This Court found that the amendment resulted in adding logical symmetry to the Act. With the
amendment, “those parties deemed employers for the purpose of being liable for worker’s
compensation benefits under I.C. § 72-102 are the same parties deemed immune from third-party
tort liability under I.C. § 72-223.” 139 Idaho at 955, 76 P.3d at 211.
Over time, when discussing this statute, this Court has referred to the statute having
established “two classes of [statutory] employers”, Robison at 955, 76 P.3d at 211; two “tests” for
a statutory employer, Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 251, 108 P.3d 392, 398
(2005); two “categories” of statutory employers, Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120,
122, 124 P.3d 996, 998 (2005); and “category one” and “category two” statutory employers,
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Fuhriman v. State, Dept. of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804-05, 153 P.3d 480, 484-85 (2007); Blake
v. Star,146 Idaho 847, 849-50, 203 P.3d 1246, 1248-49 (2009).
Category one statutory employers are “those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho
Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the
provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code.” Blake at 849, 203 P.3d at 1248 (“The parties agree that
ISG and TPS had a contractual relationship at the time of the accident, and that both Blake and
Star were working within the normal course and scope of their employment. Because ISG
‘expressly … contracted the services’ of TPS, it meets the definition of a statutory employer. See
I.C. § 72-102(13)(a).”).
Category two statutory employers “include the owner or lessee of premises, or other person
who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of
there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the
workmen there employed.” The Robison decision made clear that a category two statutory
employer does not include the mere owner of the premises where the accident occurred unless the
owner is also the virtual proprietor or operator of the business there carried on. For this
determination the court considers whether the work being done by the injured person pertains to
the business, trade or occupation of the owner. 139 Idaho at 212, 76 P.3d at 956. As stated in the
section of the trial court proceedings, the district court rejected TRC’s claim of entitlement to
category two statutory employer immunity. R. p. 209.
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B.

The district court erroneously concluded that the steel tubing contract was a contract
for services.
The district court’s conclusion that the Act and its statutory employer immunity applied in

this case was erroneous, because TRC did not contract for any services but instead only contracted
for goods. This is evident from the unambiguous terms of the Purchase Order and Invoice No.
803034 that the order was designated as “F.O.B. DELIVERED” to TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls.
Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, “the term F.O.B. (which means ‘free on board’)
at a named place, even though used only in connection with the stated price, is a delivery term
under which … when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the seller must at his own expense
and risk transport the goods to that place and there tender delivery of them ….” I. C. § 28-2319(1)(b) (emphasis added). “[I]f the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender
there.” I.C. 28-28-2-401(2)(b).
Thus, pursuant to the F.O.B. designation in the Purchase Order and Invoice No. 803034,
Brown Strauss retained title ownership of the steel tubing during transport and transported the steel
tubing at its “own expense and risk.” Had the steel tubing been lost during transportation Brown
Strauss would solely have suffered the loss. Pursuant to the F.O.B. designation, TRC did not have
title ownership of the steel tubes until tendered and accepted at TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls.
In other words, TRC did not purchase title ownership of the steel tubing in California and
then pay Brown Strauss to deliver TRC’s steel tubing to Idaho Falls. Rather, Brown Strauss paid
to transport Brown Strauss’ steel tubing to TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls whereupon TRC accepted
the tender of the steel tubing and only then became its title owner.
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As title owner of the steel tubes until tender and acceptance at TRC’s facility in Idaho Falls,
Brown Strauss contracted with Jay Transportation for the transportation of Brown Strauss’s steel
tubing. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the Purchase Order and Invoice No. 803034 did
not allocate any portion of the purchase price to transportation or shipping, that TRC did not itself
contract directly for shipping, and that TRC made no payment to Jay Transport.
Brown Strauss solely and exclusively contracted and paid for the transport, because it was
the title owner during transport. TRC did not contract or pay for the transport, because TRC was
not the title owner during transport. Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement and Invoice No.
803034, TRC was only purchasing goods – not transport or delivery services. The district court’s
conclusion that “TRC was contracting with Brown Strauss both for the purchase of the metal
tubing … and for delivery of the tubing …” is contrary to the unambiguous terms of the Purchase
Agreement and Invoice No. 803034 and the legal definition of the F.O.B. designation as defined
in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. R. p. 206 and I.C. §§ 28-2-319(1)(b), 28-28-2401(2)(b).
The contract between TRC and Brown Strauss was a contact for goods and not services.
Because TRC did not enter into a contract for services, the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act is
inapplicable and TRC is not entitled to statutory employer immunity under the Act.
This conclusion is supported by the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Venters v. Sorrento
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 392 (2004). In Venters, the Idaho Supreme Court refused
to apply statutory employer immunity to a party who did not enter into a contract for employment
services but instead entered into a contract for goods.
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In Venters, Monteirth Farms entered into a contract with Sorrento, a local cheese
manufacturer, pursuant to which Sorrento agreed to provide its manufacturing wastewater to
Monteirth Farms for use as supplemental irrigation water on its farm. Sorrento hired 3-C Trucking
to transport Sorrento’s wastewater from its cheese factory to tanks owned by Sorrento located on
property owned by Monteirth Farms. Only when Sorrento’s wastewater was placed into Sorrento’s
tanks on property owned by Monteirth Farms was Monteirth Farms entitled to use the wastewater
as supplemental irrigation water. Stanley Venters was assigned by 3-C Trucking to drive one of
the trucks. After arriving at Monteirth Farms’ property, Venters stood in an unlit area during predawn hours while waiting for his turn to unload the wastewater, whereupon he was struck and
killed by another truck that had just finished unloading. Venters’ heirs filed a wrongful death action
against Sorrento and Monteirth Farms. On summary judgment, the district court dismissed the
complaint upon concluding that both Sorrento and Monteirth Farms were entitled to statutory
employer immunity. On appeal, this Court readily agreed that Sorrento was entitled to category
one statutory employer immunity, because Sorrento had entered into a contract for trucking
services. However, this Court treated Monteirth Farms very differently. The Idaho Supreme Court
held that Monteirth Farms was not entitled to statutory employer immunity, because it was “clear
from the record that Montierth lacked even an indirect contractual employment relationship
with Mr. Venters.” Venters, 141 Idaho at 249, 108 P.3d at 396 (emphasis added).
In other words, even though Monteirth Farms had contracted to obtain supplemental
irrigation water from Sorrento, Monteirth Farms’ contract with Sorrento was not a contract for
services but was instead a contract to obtain goods (i.e. wastewater). Because Monteirth Farms did
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not enter into a contract for services with Sorrento, this Court held that Monteirth Farms was not
entitled to statutory employer immunity under the Act. 2 The Venters case reinforces the legal
principle that a party is not entitled to category one statutory employer immunity if the party did
not enter into a contract for services.
The legal similarities between TRC and Monteirth Farms in Venters are striking. Both TRC
and Monteirth Farms entered into contracts to obtain goods. Both TRC and Monteirth Farms
provided consideration for those goods, with TRC paying money and Monteirth Farms allowing
Sorrento to store its wastewater on its farm property. And both TRC and Monteirth Farms had no
ownership of the goods until the goods were tendered upon delivery. Because TRC and Monteirth
Farms did not have ownership of the goods during delivery, neither had any involvement in the
transportation of the goods.
These facts are undisputed. Just like Monteirth Farms in Venters, TRC lacked “even an
indirect contractual employment relationship” with Jay Transport and is therefore not entitled to
category one statutory employer immunity under the Act. Just as Montierth Farm’s contract with
Sorrento, which lead to Sorrento contracting with 3-C Trucking to provide trucking services, was
insufficient to establish the necessary contractual employment relationship between the truck
driver and Montierth Farms for category one immunity, TRC’s contract with Brown Strauss for
the purchase of steel tubing, which lead to Brown Strauss contracting with Jay Transport, which

2

The Idaho Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Monteirth Farms on the alternative basis that Venters’ heirs had failed to raise a triable
issue with regard to the breach of a duty of care.
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then contracted with Dale Kelly, was insufficient to establish the necessary contractual
employment relationship between Dale Kelly and TRC for category one immunity.
A second truck driver case resolved on the basis of category one statutory employer
immunity was Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 124 P.3d 996 (2005). It involved a
partial summary judgment granted to Lamb Weston, which had contracted with PSI to haul waste
from its plant to a transfer station. The waste was placed by Lamb Weston’s employees into a large
bin that could be loaded onto PSI’s truck. Mr. Gonzalez was employed by PSI as a truck driver.
He was hurt after driving the bin to the transfer station and removing the safety pin to open the
door of the bin. He contended that his injury was caused by Lamb Weston’s employees packing
too much trash into the bin. Id. at 121, 124 P.3d at 997. The trial court dismissed all of Mr.
Gonzalez’s claims against Lamb Weston on the ground that Lamb Weston was Mr. Gonzalez’s
statutory employer and therefore, immune from liability under I.C. § 72-223(1). Id. This Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision, deeming the case controlled by Venters. Id. Just like Sorrento
contracting with 3-C Trucking in Venters, Lamb Weston had contracted with PSI for hauling
services. Such established the necessary contractual employment relationship between Lamb
Weston and Mr. Gonzalez. Id. at 122, 124 P.3d at 998.
Venters and Gonzalez establish that in cases brought by truck drivers, category one
statutory employer immunity is limited to those parties who expressly enter into a contract for
trucking services. Simply having a contract with another party for another purpose, even if such
contract is indirectly related to another contract for trucking services, is insufficient to confer
category one immunity upon a party who did not contract for trucking services.
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As the Kellys pointed out at the hearing on TRC’s motion for summary judgment, TRC
did not expressly hire Dale or any other trucking company. Likewise, TRC did not impliedly or
indirectly hire Dale. Instead, Brown Strauss is the only party to the subject buy-sell agreement that
contracted directly and expressly for trucking services. Based on Jay Transport subcontracting the
transportation of the shipment to Dale, it was Brown Strauss who impliedly or indirectly hired
Dale. That indirect employment relationship made Brown Strauss, not TRC, Dale’s statutory
employer. Tr. pp. 30-34.
The district court below failed to understand and follow this Court’s holdings in Venters
and Gonzalez and erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of TRC. Therefore, the district
court’s Judgment of Dismissal should be reversed.
C.

The district court’s reliance on Spencer V. Allpress Logging, Inc. was misplaced.
The district court improperly relied upon Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856,

11 P.3d 475 (2000) in holding that the steel tubing contract was a contract for services and granting
TRC’s motion for summary judgment. The Spencer case is readily distinguishable and inapplicable
to the facts of the instant appeal.
In Spencer, Steve Schilling entered into a contract with Weyerhaeuser, a lumber mill,
pursuant to which Weyerhaeuser purchased standing timber located on property owned by
Schilling. Under the contract, Weyerhaeuser advanced Schilling the amount of $100,000 and in
return Weyerhaeuser was given the right to cut and remove the timber itself and to build and
maintain logging roads on the property for that purpose. Notwithstanding, Weyerhaeuser
contracted with Schilling to also harvest the timber and deliver it to Weyerhaeuser’s mill. Under
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the contract, when each load of harvested timber was delivered to Weyerhaeuser, Schilling’s
advance was reduced and Weyerhaeuser issued a separate check to cover the cost of harvesting the
timber. Id. 134 Idaho at 857, 11 P.3d at 476. “On all but two occasions, checks [for the logging]
were issued from Weyerhaeuser . . . directly to Schilling who deposited them into his personal
account. Schilling would then pay Allpress out of this account. Twice, Weyerhaeuser made a
draw (an advanced payment) for harvesting costs. For these two draws, Weyerhaeuser issued the
checks to both Schilling and Allpress. Schilling endorsed the checks, and Allpress cashed them.”
Id. at 857-58, 11 P.3d at 476-77. Weyerhaeuser also agreed to assume the risk of loss of the timber
during the contract period. Id. 134 Idaho at 857, 11 P.3d at 476.
Schilling did not harvest the timber himself. Instead, Schilling contracted with Allpress
Logging to do so. An employee of Allpress Logging, Justin Spencer, was seriously injured while
harvesting the timber when a line machine pulling logs up a hill tipped over on top of him. Neither
Schilling nor Allpress Logging had worker’s compensation insurance. Id. 134 Idaho at 858, 11
P.3d at 477.
The Idaho Industrial Commission concluded that Allpress and Schilling were Spencer’s
employer and statutory employer and therefore liable for his worker’s compensation benefits.
However, the Idaho Industrial Commission ultimately concluded that Weyerhaeuser was not
Spencer’s statutory employer and therefore not liable for Spencer’s worker’s compensation
benefits. Schilling appealed and Spencer cross-appealed the ruling that Weyerhaeuser was not his
statutory employer. Schilling later dismissed his appeal, leaving Weyerhaeuser to respond only to
Spencer’s cross appeal. Id. at 858-59, 11 P.3d at 477-78.
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Weyerhaeuser opposed Spencer’s appeal by arguing that it was not Spencer’s statutory
employer, because it had only contracted for the purchase of timber and had not contracted for any
services from Schilling. Spencer, 134 Idaho at 861, 11 P.3d at 480. It appears that Weyerhaeuser
was arguing that it was not the statutory employer, because it had only entered into a contract for
the purchase of goods and not a contract for services subject to the Act. Not surprisingly, the Idaho
Supreme Court rejected Weyerhaeuser’s argument, concluding the record clearly showed that
Weyerhaeuser had in fact entered into a contract for Schilling’s logging services. Id. This Court
reached this conclusion in part because “Weyerhaeuser contracted to pay Schilling for the price of
harvesting…[and] part of the price was also included as part of the cost for delivery.” Id. Because
“Weyerhaeuser was contracting with Schilling for logging,” it had clearly entered into a contract
for services, and there is no question that Weyerhaeuser was a statutory employer under the Act.
Id.
Unlike in Spencer, the goods in this case on appeal were F.O.B. to the buyer’s facility.
Unlike Weyerhaeuser in Spencer, TRC did not have title ownership to the goods or any right to
take the goods prior to being tendered by the seller at its facility. Unlike the contract in Spencer,
TRC’s Purchase Order and Invoice did not allocate any portion of the purchase price to
transportation or delivery. Unlike Weyerhaeuser in Spencer, TRC did not pay any portion of the
transportation costs incurred by the seller. Therefore, unlike the contract in the Spencer case, the
contract between TRC and Brown Strauss was a contract for the purchase of goods only and not a
contract for services governed by the Act.
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The Spencer decision did not address a contract for the purchase of goods only. It only
addressed a contract for services. It is therefore inapplicable to the matter presently on appeal
involving TRC’s contract for the purchase of goods. The district court’s reliance upon the Spencer
decision was improper.
D.

Alternatively, this Court should hold that a purchaser of goods is not a statutory
employer of the delivery person and is not entitled to statutory employer immunity
under the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act.
As argued at length above, a party is entitled to statutory employer immunity under the Act

only if the party entered into a contract for services. If a party claiming entitlement to statutory
employer immunity did not enter into a contract for services, the Act does not apply and the party
is not entitled to the Act’s statutory employer immunity. Because TRC entered into a contract for
the purchase of goods and not a contract for services, the Act does not apply to this case, and TRC
is not entitled to statutory employer immunity under the Act.
Alternatively, even if the Court were to conclude that the contract between TRC and Brown
Strauss was subject to the Act, many other jurisdictions have held that a purchaser of goods with
ancillary delivery is not entitled to statutory employer immunity under applicable worker’s
compensation laws. “A contract for the sale and purchase of a product even though it includes the
delivery and unloading of the product upon the premises of the purchaser, does not render the
seller's delivery man a statutory employee of the purchaser.” Shipley v. Gipson, 773 S.W.2d 505,
507 (Mo. App. 1989).
Having adopted the concept of statutory employer immunity, many other jurisdictions have
reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787-88
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(W.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that the Ford Motor Company who purchased panels from the Budd
Company who manufactured, sold and delivered the panels was not the statutory employer of the
Budd Company’s employee who was injured during the delivery of the panels); Meyer v. Piggly
Wiggly No. 24, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 761, 763 (S.C. 2000) (holding that Piggly Wiggly who purchased
cake products from a vendor was not the statutory employer of the vendor’s employee who was
injured during delivery of the cake products); Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 Va. 42, 471
S.E.2d 473 (Va. 1996) (holding that JTE Constructors who purchased panels from RECO was not
the statutory employer of RECO’s employee who was injured during delivery of the panels);
Mobley v. Flowers, 440 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a general contractor who purchased
bricks from a vendor was not the statutory employer of the vendor’s employee who was injured
during delivery of the bricks); Gray Bldg. Sys. v. Trine, 391 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 1990) (holding that
Gray Building Systems who purchased lintels from Dave’s Welding Service was not the statutory
employer of Dave’s Welding Service’s employee who was injured during delivery of the lintels);
Shipley v. Gipson, 773 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Mo. App. 1989) (holding that a sawmill that purchased
uncut logs from a vendor was not the statutory employer of vendor’s employee who was injured
during delivery of the uncut logs); Wilson v. Daniel Intern. Corp., 197 S.E.2d 686 (S.C. 1973)
(holding that Daniel Construction Company who purchased concrete from Winyah Concrete was
not the statutory employer of Winyah Concrete’s employee who was injured during delivery of
the concrete); Hacker v. Brookover Feed Yard, Inc., 202 Kan. 582, 451 P.2d 506 (Kan.1969)
(holding that a feed lot who contracted to purchase silage from a farmer was not the statutory
employer of the farmer’s employee who was injured during delivery of the silage); Doyle v.
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Missouri Val. Constructors, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 121 (D. Colo. 1968) (holding that Missouri Valley
Constructors who purchased concrete from a Vendor was not the statutory employer of the
vendor’s employee who was injured during delivery of the concrete); Garrett v. Tubular Prods.,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Va. 1959) (holding that Tubular Products who purchased steel
columns from a manufacturer was not the statutory employer of the manufacturer’s employee who
was injured during delivery of the steel columns).
This purpose underlying this legal principle was addressed in the case of Davis v. Ford
Motor Company, 244 F.Supp.2d 784 (W.D. Dist. Ky 2003), as follows:
The intended purpose of [Kentucky’s statutory employer law] is to discourage
contractors from hiring fiscally irresponsible subcontractors and thus eliminate
workers’ compensation liability. It accomplishes this purpose by imposing
workers’ compensation liability upon the “up the ladder” contractor for
compensation to the employees of a subcontractor unless the subcontractor has
provided for the payment. Because the “up the ladder” contractor is ultimately
responsible for providing workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees of
its subcontractors, the contractor enjoys the immunity provided by [Kentucky’s
statutory employer law].
Id. at 788-89 (internal citations to cases and statutes omitted). The Davis court then noted that
“[p]ractically speaking, the effect of classifying the large number of purchasers of goods as
statutory contractors is to make them immune from negligence actions, which could be to the
detriment of Kentucky’s workers. This cannot be what the Kentucky General Assembly had in
mind when it enacted KRS 342.610(2).” The Davis court then predicted that the Kentucky
Supreme Court “would adhere to the majority view that a mere purchaser of goods is not a statutory
[employer] of the seller . . ., absent some special circumstances.” Id.
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Idaho’s Workers’ Compensation Act and its statutory employer laws have the same
purpose as that of Kentucky’s worker’s compensation law. “The Idaho Code sections dealing with
the concept of statutory employer are designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability
under the workmen’s compensation statutes by sub-contracting the work to others.” Spencer, 134
Idaho at 860, 11 P.3d at 479 (citing Adam v. Titan Equip. Supply Corp., 93 Idaho 644, 646, 470
P.2d 409, 411 (1970)).
The case of Ferguson v. Air-Hydraulics Co., 492 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1973) is very
similar to this case presently on appeal. In Ferguson, Ryerson Steel Co. contracted to sell steel
sheets to Air-Hydraulics Company (“AHC”). Ryerson Steel Co. hired Ryder Truck Leasing to
deliver the steel sheets to AHC. Ryder Trucking Leasing assigned its driver, Mr. Ferguson, to
deliver a load of nearly 2600 pounds of steel sheets to AHC. An AHC employee used a forklift to
remove the steel sheets from the truck. The AHC forklift operator picked up the load and began
backing toward the plant door. After backing up five or six feet, the back wheels of the forklift,
due to the weight in front, came up off the ground. Mr. Ferguson got on the forklift to provide
additional weight to lower the back wheels. Mr. Ferguson had extended his right hand to hold onto
a stationary bar on the forklift. When the AHC forklift operator lowered the load, the load crushed
Mr. Ferguson’s right hand. After a jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Ferguson, AHC filed an
appeal, asserting that Mr. Ferguson was its statutory employee under applicable worker’s
compensation law. This argument was rejected. The court explained that “[t]he relationship
existing between Air-Hydraulics and Ryerson Steel, to whom the driver and truck were leased,

24

was that of buyer and seller rather than one of contract to unload. Under such circumstances
Ferguson cannot be held to be a statutory employee.” Id. at 136.
More recently, the Missouri Supreme Court cited Ferguson with approval for the
proposition that the determination of whether a party is a statutory employer is “a fact driven
inquiry; there is no litmus paper test.” McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473,
480 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts of that case were that Mr. McCracken
was employed by IBC as a truck driver to deliver its bread products to its customers, including
Wal-Mart. He was injured at Wal-Mart when a Wal-Mart employee negligently pushed a empty
bread rack into his shoulder. Id. at 475-76. The trial court granted Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss,
concluding it was Mr. McCracken’s statutory employer. On appeal the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed. Focusing on the real role and relationship between Mr. McCracken and Wal-Mart, the
Court concluded that “Mr. McCracken was a delivery driver for a supplier, IBC, while Wal-Mart
was a buyer. . . By delivering bread, Mr. McCracken’s role was to equip Wal-Mart for business,
not to engage in its business himself.” Id. at 481. The Court, therefore, held that the trial court
erred in holding that Mr. McCracken was a statutory employee of Wal-Mart. Id.
Wal-Mart has many stores in Idaho. Would Idaho courts resolve the issue presented in
McCracken differently? Vendors delivering their goods to customers is common in Idaho. The
undersigned’s law firm has contractual arrangements to purchase goods such as soft drinks, bottled
water and coffee from vendors who regularly deliver those goods to our law firm. Is the delivery
person a statutory employee of our law firm? Is our law firm the statutory employer of the delivery
person? If the delivery person is injured while driving to our office to deliver the purchased goods,
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is our law firm liable for the delivery person’s worker’s compensation benefits if the person’s
direct employer fails to have applicable worker’s compensation insurance? Likewise, if our firm
has failed to exercise due care in maintaining our premises, such that an unsafe condition is present
at the time of delivery and causes injury to the delivery person while bringing in the purchased
goods, is our law firm entitled to statutory employer immunity from the delivery person’s
negligence claim? The answer to each of these hypothetical questions must be “no.”
Consider a hypothetical presented to the district court below where an office manager of
ABC Inc. purchases a stapler online from Amazon, and Amazon contracts with UPS to deliver the
stapler. R. p. 95. Does the mere fact that Amazon agreed to deliver the stapler instead of requiring
that the office manager personally pick it up convert this contract for the sale of goods into a
contract for services under the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act, and thereby automatically make
ABC Inc. the statutory employer of the UPS delivery person? The obvious answer is again “no.”
A contract for the sale of goods with ancillary delivery remains a contract for the sale of goods
and not a contract for services for purposes of the definition of “employer” under I.C. § 72102(13)(a) of the Act.
If the question above were answered differently, then ABC Inc. as the statutory employer
in this hypothetical would be automatically obligated to provide workers compensation insurance
to every delivery person, and ABC Inc. would be immune from any tort liability to every delivery
person under I.C. § 72-223(1). This would obligate every business purchaser of delivered goods
to pay for worker’s compensation insurance for the delivery person or alternatively demand a
certificate of insurance from the delivery person. This would also make every business purchaser
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liable for workers compensation benefits for every injury to every delivery person regardless of
where the injury took place so long as the injury occurred at some point along the many mileslong path of delivery of the goods. This would also allow every business purchaser of delivered
goods to avoid liability with impunity for the purchaser’s own tortious conduct toward the delivery
person. And, this would require that workers compensation sureties collect premiums for the
delivery persons as additional statutory employees which would be impossible to administratively
manage. Id. at pp. 12-13 (R. p. 95-96).
TRC’s response to these hypotheticals was to assert that it is ridiculous to think that a
delivery service like UPS would not have applicable worker’s compensation coverage for its
drivers. However, TRC admitted that “in the rare circumstance where [the driver’s direct employer
has no worker’s compensation insurance] … ABC, Inc., would … be liable as a statutory employer
… for the injured driver making the delivery to ABC, Inc.” R. p. 184 (italics in original).
These hypotheticals are particularly poignant given the current coronavirus pandemic and
the Idaho Governor’s current stay-at-home order, which has resulted in the closure of many stores
and restaurants that now only offer delivery of goods to customers. Given the vast number of local
deliveries occurring under the circumstances, it would be unworkable for every commercial
customer to be treated as the statutory employer of every unknown person delivering ordered
goods and to be required to purchase worker’s compensation insurance for each delivery person
or demand a certificate of insurance from each delivery persons. This is not required by the Act
and could not have been intended by the Idaho legislature. As held by many jurisdictions, a
purchaser of goods with ancillary delivery is not a statutory employer under the Act.
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The issue of whether a purchaser of goods with ancillary delivery is a statutory employer
of the seller’s employees or contractors involved in manufacturing, fabricating, loading or
delivering the purchased goods is one of first impression for this Court. As an alternative argument
to those presented above, the Kellys urge this Court to reverse the district court below and to
instead follow the well-considered decisions of other jurisdictions that have dealt with this precise
issue.
E.

Alternatively, this Court should adopt the Predominant Factor Test for the purpose
of determining whether a contract is a contract for the purchase of goods governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code or a contract for services governed by the Idaho
Worker’s Compensation Act.
As the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized in McCracken, the outcome of these cases

may well be fact-driven, with no bright-line or litmus paper test available for a court to use in
making its determination. 298 S.W.3d at 480 (2009). As an alternative argument to those presented
above, the Kellys urged the court below to apply the “predominant factor test” when determining
whether a contract including both goods and services is sufficient to make the buyer of goods a
statutory employer of the seller’s employees and contractors, including its delivery person. R. p.
207. This test has traditionally been used by Idaho courts when deciding whether a contract is a
“contract for services” or a “contract for the sale of goods” subject to the Uniform Commercial
Code. See Silicon Int'l Ore, LLC Co. v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 546, 314 P.3d 593, 601
(2013); Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 709, 52 P.3d 848, 854 (2002). Recently,
an Idaho Federal District Court Judge applied the predominant factor test in determining whether
a contract was a contract for services or a contract for the sale of goods for purposes of determining
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the applicability of the IWCA and its statutory employer immunity. See Schuler v. Battelle Energy
All., LLC, No. 4:18-CV-00234-CWD, 2019 WL 5295461 (D. Idaho Oct. 18, 2019) (Magistrate
Judge Candy Dale, presiding). R. pp. 144-71 (Roche Aff. p. 2, Exh. 6).
The Court may find it useful to utilize the Predominant Factor Test when resolving this and
other potentially fact-driven cases involving statutory employer immunity in the context of
contracts for purchase of goods with ancillary delivery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The contract between TRC and Brown Strauss was a contract for the purchase of goods
only. Because TRC did not enter into a contact for services, the Idaho Worker’s Compensation
Act is inapplicable, and TRC is not entitled to statutory employer immunity under the Act.
Alternatively, the Court should hold that purchasers of goods with ancillary delivery are not
statutory employers of the delivery persons and are not entitled to statutory employer immunity
under the Act.
For these reasons and all others discussed above, the Appellants respectfully urge this
Court to reverse the district court’s Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment in favor
of TRC and the Judgment of Dismissal, allowing for further proceedings on the negligence and
loss of consortium claims set forth in their complaint.
DATED this 23rd day of April 2020.
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
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BRENT O. ROCHE
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